Examples of long-term fortifications. Option for tactical actions when destroying a bunker.

bunker- long-term firing point. Usually a concrete or reinforced concrete, less often a steel fortification structure for firing from heavy small arms or artillery systems. Can be located on the surface or buried in the ground. Sometimes the term DOS is used - long-term fire structure.

bunker- wood-earth firing point. This is a field structure for firing heavy small arms. There were bunkers for artillery systems, but very rarely. Usually this is a wooden frame made of logs and beams dug into the ground. Variations using other local materials are possible. Thus, Finnish bunkers often had double log walls filled with fragments of granite. Sometimes the term DZOS is used - wood-earth fire structure.

Casemate- a room in a long-term fortification structure intended for the placement of weapons systems, ammunition and other materiel.

Barracks- a room in a long-term fortification structure intended for shelter and rest of personnel.

Caponier- a structure adjacent to the main fortification structure intended for firing along the walls of the main fortification structure in order to destroy enemy soldiers who broke through directly to it. A caponier capable of firing in only one direction is called a semi-caponier.

Examples of long-term fortifications

Let's look at various options for bunkers, using the example of those that were built on the Mannerheim Line and stormed by Soviet troops during the war between Finland and the USSR (11/30/1939-3/13/1940).

Single embrasure bunker with barracks for 26 people

The pillbox is designed to conduct flanking fire in one direction. It is covered from the front by a small hill, but the armored cap (1) of the command and observation post (COP), rising above the roof of the bunker and projected against the sky, gives away the location of the structure.

On the rear side of the bunker there are two entrances - casemate (2) and barracks (1).
The thickness of the external walls and ceilings is 90 cm, the internal walls are 40-60 cm. The doors are made of planks 5 cm thick, lined with thin iron. Two heating stove pipes and four ventilation pipes rise above the roof.

The pillbox consists of one machine-gun casemate (1) measuring 2x3 meters, a barracks (2) equipped with two-tier bunks for 26 people, a command and observation post room (3) with an armored cap and a service room (4). This room was probably intended for storing material supplies, or was used as a command post for the commander of a unit (company or battalion) defending a given area of ​​terrain.
You can get into the casemate from the corridor (5), which connects to the control room, the barracks (2) and the casemate vestibule (6). You can enter the barracks both from the corridor and from the outside through the barracks entrance through the double vestibule (7 and 7a).
Only the barracks are heated by two stoves installed in enclosures formed by reinforcing short walls-pilasters. There is no well or latrine in the building.
There was a telephone only in the premises of the checkpoint. There is no internal communication in the bunker. Exhaust ventilation with the help of pipes extending onto the bunker cover from the barracks (two pipes), the control point (one pipe and the machine gun casemate (one pipe). There is no electrical wiring, and therefore no electric lighting in the building. There is also no place for fuel storage. The floor is concrete, covered with boards.
There are no additional loopholes either in the doors or in the walls for self-defense of the structure. The height of the room is 1.9 -2 meters. The walls outside are the color of bare concrete, inside they are whitewashed with lime.

Double-hammer bunker with barracks for 24 people

It is completely placed on the surface, with only two walls (back and side) slightly embedded in the slope of the hill. From the front it is covered by a stone ridge and is inaccessible to either artillery fire or tanks. It is also difficult for infantry to reach it from the front, because the approaches to the ridge are covered with flanking fire by another bunker or bunker. Two embrasures placed on a ledge allow firing in only one direction - towards one’s right flank. The armored cap of the command and observation post (3) rises above the structure.

The bunker has two entrances - barracks (2) and casemate (1). Through the casemate entrance through the vestibule you can get into one of the two machine-gun casemates, and from it into the corridor and other rooms of the bunker. Through the barracks entrance you can get into the barracks through the vestibule, and from there into the rest of the bunker rooms. Both entrances are closed with wooden doors made of 5 cm thick boards, covered with thin roofing iron.

All walls of the bunker are vertical reinforced concrete with a thickness of 70-90cm. The covering of the structure is also reinforced concrete with a thickness of 70-90 cm. A similar bunker of an older construction does not have an armored cap. The thickness of the internal walls is from 40 to 60cm. The internal height of the premises is about 2 meters. The height of the firing line (from the ground to the middle of the embrasures) is 1.6 m. The dimensions of the embrasures on the outside are 60x20cm.

Inside, it consists of two machine-gun casemates (1 and 2), a room for a command and observation post (3) (practically it’s just a vestibule under an armored cap) and a barracks with two-tier bunks for 24 people (4). These are the main premises of the bunker. The barracks, machine-gun casemates and control points are connected by a corridor (5). The casemate entrance has a casemate vestibule (6), and the barracks entrance has a double barracks vestibule (7). From the barracks, through the door you can get into a small room (8), for the commander of the unit (company or battalion) defending this area of ​​the terrain.

In the enclosures formed by transverse short reinforcing walls (9) there is a stove and a well, as well as racks for ammunition, food and other supplies.
There was a telephone only in the premises of the checkpoint. There is no internal communication in the bunker. Exhaust ventilation using pipes extending onto the bunker cover from every room except vestibules and the corridor. There is no electrical wiring, and therefore no electric lighting, in the building. There is also no latrine or place to store fuel.
In machine gun casemates, embrasures do not have any metal flaps, devices for securing the machine gun, placing boxes with cartridge belts, or anti-grenade nets. There are no devices for forced ventilation of at least machine-gun casemates (in other bunkers there was still forced ventilation of casemates with manual drive).
The floor throughout the building is concrete. The outer walls are not painted and do not have any devices (hooks, loops, rods) for organizing camouflage, but the color of the concrete itself, in combination with the moss that covers most of the walls and covering, gives a tone close to the surrounding area. The interior walls are whitewashed with lime.
There are no additional embrasures or loopholes for the purpose of self-defense of the bunker either in the doors or in the walls.

Four-hammer bunker with barracks for 30 people

Designed to conduct flanking fire in the direction of both flanks. It has two embrasures in each direction. From the front, the bunker is covered with an embankment. On the roof of the bunker there is an armored cap for surveillance.

It has four machine gun casemates (No. 1, 2, 3, 4). Casemates No. 1 and 3 each have one machine-gun embrasure, and casemates No. 2 and 4, in addition, have one additional embrasure in the rear wall of the pillbox for firing from personal weapons.
The figure shows part of the bunker with casemates No. 3 and 4. Blue arrows with the letter A indicate the main machine gun embrasures, and the letter B shows additional ones for firing from personal weapons. One of them is on the wall of casemate No. 4, and the second is in the wall of the casemate corridor. This embrasure provides protection for the open vestibule of casemate No. 4. It is clearly visible that you can get inside the bunker through the open vestibule and the door of casemate No. 4, first into the casemate, and then from it into the casemate corridor, and from there into casemate No. 3 and the bunker barracks. The situation is similar on the opposite side of the bunker, where casemates Nos. 1 and 2 are located (in a mirror image).

In the bunker barracks (1) there are two-tier bunks for thirty people, a heating stove (2), the pipe of which is led through the back wall of the bunker and a well (3). The barracks can only be accessed from the casemate corridors. In the enclosures formed by reinforcing walls-pilasters, shelving for property is arranged.
In addition, the bunker has a service room (4) and a command and observation post room (5) above which there is an armored cap in the roof.

The thickness of the external walls is 90-110cm, internal 40-60. Roof 90cm. The floor is concrete. There is no lighting inside. The telephone cable was installed in the barracks, and not in the office building or control room. The wooden doors, covered with sheet iron, are locked from the inside. There are one ventilation pipes in the machine gun casemates, two in the barracks and one in the service room.
The bunker does not have any camouflage paint or other camouflage. It is located entirely on the surface and is clearly visible from the rear. From the front it is well camouflaged by a mound overgrown with grass, moss and small bushes.
Judging by the capacity of the barracks and the possibility of firing in the direction of both flanks, it can be assumed that this bunker was the key one in a certain area.

Option for tactical actions when destroying a bunker

Detecting a bunker is not an easy task; the bunker is usually well camouflaged. The bunker looks like a simple mound on the ground. The bunker is lined with turf, and if positions are prepared in advance, it can contain not only grass, but also bushes and even trees.

The bunker embrasure is usually closed except during periods of firing. Observation is carried out either using special periscopes, or simply from a different position. The machine gun crew of a bunker can fire “blindly”, receiving instructions from the outside, since when constructing bunkers, all landmarks and lines are targeted in advance. The flap can hide the embrasure well. Often, the damper is a massive concrete slab that is raised and lowered using jacks.
From the outside, the embrasure can be covered with a wide-mesh camouflage net through which fire is fired. In addition, a second, denser internal camouflage net can be used, which is removed before opening fire. The external network is stationary; It is attached with its upper edge to pegs driven into the pavement, and with its lower edge to pegs driven into the ground. The internal net is movable, since it is attached with its upper edge to the folding shield of the embrasure, and with its lower edge to the same pegs as the outer net. When firing, simultaneously with the discarded shield of the embrasure, the internal network also falls.

The main difficulty in the fight against Finnish bunkers during the Soviet-Finnish war was that these structures were skillfully applied to the terrain and were located so that from a great distance they were practically invisible (hidden by folds of the terrain, forest), but when approaching Our tanks and guns often could not do this due to numerous natural and artificial obstacles. In addition, many of the bunkers were intended for flanking fire and were completely invisible from the front and inaccessible to flat fire.

The same skillful application of bunkers to the terrain led artillery observers to numerous errors in the firing results (it was difficult to correctly estimate the range of shell explosions from the target). Thus, the Soviet infantry found itself face to face with the bunker and the surrounding bunkers and trenches of the Finnish infantry.

It must be taken into account that the fire is fired from the depths of the room, so flashes of shots and pulsating streams of smoke are almost invisible to anyone. Only those who look deep into the embrasure can see something. A slight shift to the side - flashes and smoke become invisible. There are very few points from which they can be seen, and they, as a rule, are known to the bunker garrison and are well targeted. There is also no cloud of dust raised by powder gases. The sound is muffled and its source is unclear. Pillboxes are often designed exclusively for flanking fire and are deployed to the front at an angle approaching 90 degrees. In this case, parallel to the direction of fire towards the enemy, a shaft is poured, which does not allow shelling of the embrasure from the front.

It is possible to identify the enemy bunker system by indirect signs: by the paths leading to them, by the movement of soldiers, by wisps of smoke from ventilation pipes; according to the presence of sentries.
At night and at dusk, it is easier to detect embrasures - by flashes from shots. If D0T is silent, then you need to try to provoke fire in the same way as they provoke sniper fire - using dolls.
If flashes are detected at night, then the direction of them is marked with small white pegs (matches). Two pegs are driven into the ground so that over the tips of both pegs the gaze rests under the flash. During the day, using pegs in the same direction, they inspect the area. If flares are short-lived, you should at least approximately “link” the flare to any landmark - a star or a tree visible against the sky.

By the way, hanging with pegs can also be used to organize fire at night - directions to probable areas of fire are marked before dark, and at night they are used to guide the target.
The night designation of the direction of movement (attack) is based on the same principle. Two fires or other light sources are placed one behind the other in the direction of movement; If the group, when moving, deviates from the main direction of movement, then the light sources, when looking back, begin to diverge from one another. If the group adheres to the correct direction of movement, then the light sources merge into one.
You can also indicate the direction of movement by fixing the machine gun in one position and shooting tracer bullets, aiming slightly to the side of the target that needs to be achieved by moving. To prevent the enemy from understanding why they are shooting at one place, several false firing points are assigned that fire tracer bullets.

Upon discovery of the bunkers, you need to try to strip them with artillery fire, remove their earthen jacket - to make it easier for your troops to navigate and then fire with concrete-piercing shells. Methodical bombardment of a bunker with artillery fire makes it possible to disable its garrison without destruction, since constant explosions have a shocking effect.

To create cover for attackers, the area in the immediate vicinity of the bunker is bombarded with artillery, which creates craters. Folds in the terrain and craters will make it possible for a small group of soldiers to secretly crawl to the firing point within a short throw.

Of course, the enemy will try to restore the earthen jacket by covering the bunker with sandbags and filling up the craters surrounding it. The attackers' task is to prevent this from happening with fire. Considering that craters are good cover, the enemy can mine them.

Attackers should take into account that often bunkers are surrounded by a group of 3-4 bunkers (wood-earth firing points) or placed in a group of the same bunkers, some of which are “silent”. “Silent” firing points open fire either at the most intense moments of the battle or after the attackers have destroyed other bunkers and bunkers, which allows “silent” firing points not to be detected for a long time.

To storm bunkers, suppression of all enemy firing points is organized. It is difficult to achieve the destruction of fortified points, that’s why they are fortified. It is best to place artillery of a small caliber for direct fire to fire at bunkers, but the enemy will actively oppose the work of such artillery. Therefore, suppression in this case will consist of preventing the enemy from conducting observation and, accordingly, adjusting fire. A blinded firing point will generally fire at no man's land, which must be crossed as quickly as possible.
Additionally, positions around the bunker are surrounded by fire to prevent enemy reinforcements from being brought to it.

Fortified firing points that mutually support each other must be attacked simultaneously. The fact is that the bunker can continue to operate even after the attacking infantry climbs onto its roof. And with mutual fire, pillboxes can clear each other of attackers. Enemy artillery can do the same. She can fire at her own bunker, knowing that the garrison is not afraid of fire. Actually, this is the peculiarity of storming a position equipped with pillboxes. In the worst case, you need to simulate an attack on a neighboring bunker with a small unit so that, while defending itself, the bunker garrison stops supporting its neighbor. If possible, the enemy's view of the captured bunker should be prevented by placing smoke.

We also need sniper fire at the embrasures and viewing slots to force the bunker garrison to close the shutter and stop shooting. You can use armored vehicles to plug embrasures or firing sectors of bunkers.

After suppressing the bunkers and conducting a conventional attack on the positions between the bunkers, a special group is sent through the enemy’s positions to his rear, without stopping to clear the trenches, with the goal of subsequently approaching the bunker from its rear side - from the side of the door. At the same time, units must be allocated that clear and control positions around the bunker. To pass through the positions, armored personnel carriers or tanks with drags attached to armored sleds can be used.

In the immediate vicinity of the bunker there is always space that is not fired upon by the bunker itself, which should be used. A group of attackers comes from the side of the bunker door, trying to blow it up and throw grenades at the bunker garrison.
When throwing in a grenade with a retarder, it is advisable, after pulling the pin, release the lever and count “twenty-two, twenty-two” (2 seconds), and then throw the grenade into the bunker room. A 2-second hold will prevent the grenades from being thrown back or from being thrown by the garrison into the grenade detonation niches inside the bunker.
If the door is armored and it is not possible to undermine it, or there is a special embrasure covering the approach to the door, then you can use the ventilation shafts or try to use the embrasures. After blowing up the ventilation holes, you can pour gasoline or another flammable mixture into them and detonate them. The resulting fire can cause serious damage to the bunker garrison.

To enhance the effect of the explosion, it is recommended to use the double detonation method. Two charges are lowered onto a rope into the ventilation hole. One (the top one) should explode a little before the bottom one. Then its blast wave will create a kind of wall, from which the blast wave of the second explosion will be reflected and direct the explosion inward. If it is not possible to undermine the embrasures, then they must be filled with sandbags. Sometimes it is possible to close the embrasure of a bunker using a long pole or overcoat. You can try throwing smoke bombs into the air ducts.
An attack on a bunker must be carried out very quickly, otherwise the enemy will throw the attackers from the bunker, and with the help of the bunker’s fire, you can clear field positions occupied during the assault.

[ all articles ]

In many Soviet films about the war, we heard the word bunker. What is a bunker and how was it used? Military experts know the answer to this question, but modern generations who have not seen the war live will be interested.

Bunker as an element of soldier protection

If we talk about the bunker (decoding - wood-earth firing point), then at one time it was a fairly effective means of camouflage, intended for firing at enemy forces. Note that if the shelter was well camouflaged, the enemy could not destroy it. The main combat task of the soldiers who were sitting at this point was to inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible, while keeping the bunker itself intact and safe.

What is a bunker with a frameless structure? This is a military structure that is partially buried in the ground. Internal equipment is minimal. The embrasure is so wide that fire can be fired within a radius of up to 50 degrees. It is advisable to install a shield on top of the embrasure to protect against grenades, because a precise hit from a grenade or other dangerous object will destroy the bunker. What is the destruction of this fortification? Of course, the death of the soldiers who were in it.

Such firing points are no longer used today

Today's young military personnel will only be able to learn about the bunker in military history classes, which was relevant during the Second World War. An earthen firing point is an engineering structure that was used already during the 1st World War. Materials for construction: earth, grass for camouflage.

Everything is clear about the land. A bunker is being constructed in a deeply dug hole. What is camouflage grass? The firing position must be covered as much as possible in order to give the area of ​​this fortification the most natural appearance. Wood and stones are used in the construction of the bunker. In the images we see a log roof. Stones could be used in different ways, for example for flooring.

Field fortification

bunker

Pillbox is an abbreviation that stands for quite simply - Long-term Firing Point, i.e. a fire structure capable of withstanding the enemy’s onslaught for a long time. Sometimes instead of the abbreviation DOT, DOS is used, i.e.

long-term fire structure. These abbreviations are widely known and used by everyone, including the military.

However, this is a tactical name for the structure.

Military engineers call them long and boring - Reinforced concrete (concrete, brick) structure for firing from a machine gun (cannon).

It is worth distinguishing the concept of bunker (DOS) from the concept of bunker (DZOS). Given the similarity of the abbreviations, the second stands for wood-earth firing point, i.e. approximately the same thing, but built not from reinforced concrete or concrete, but from logs and earth.

In the second half of the sixties - the first half of the seventies, many such bunkers were built in fortified areas (UR) along the Soviet-Chinese border from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok.

Officially, this structure in the language of fortifiers is called “Reinforced concrete structure with a special installation
for a machine gun."

The volume of excavated soil for this bunker (we will call this structure that way for brevity) is 250 cubic meters. Labor consumption is 5.2 machine-hours of a bulldozer, 8 machine-hours of a truck crane, 450 man-hours (of which 175 hour-hours directly for installation of the structure). The consumption of reinforced concrete is 26 cubic meters, plus an additional 35 cubic meters of reinforced concrete for the anti-ballistic mattress.

The entire bunker is completely hidden underground. Only the upper plane of the combat casemate and the heads of the ventilation equipment and heating system reach the surface of the earth.

The picture on the right shows this bunker without weapons. The nature of the weapons installed depends on what tactical tasks a particular bunker is intended to solve.

As one of the weapon options for the bunker model 1962. FSUE "Rosvooruzheniye of the Russian Federation" offers the "Universal firing structure "Gorchak".

Brief description of Gorchak:
It is an armored fighting compartment with a hinged top cover on which a weapon system and observation devices are mounted. The structure is hidden in the ground up to the level of the top cover and is therefore difficult to detect and practically invulnerable. In a hidden position, a crew of two people monitors the battlefield using periscope devices. To fire, the cover with the weapons unit is raised above the ground, while the crew remains inside the sealed firing structure. The weapon is aimed mechanically. Capable of hitting tanks, lightly armored targets and enemy personnel.
The total weight of the set is 3.5 tons. Diameter 2.315 m, height 1.88 m.
Weapon set:
-automatic grenade launcher AGS-17;
-7.62mm. PKT machine gun;
-12.7mm. NSV machine gun;

-ATRK (anti-tank missile system).
Ammunition:
- rounds for AGS-17 - 360 pieces,
-cartridges for the PKT machine gun - 1700 pcs.,
-cartridge for the NSV machine gun - 480 pcs,

-ATGM - 4 pcs.

Let's consider a bunker as a structure.

It consists of the main structure (1), a combat casemate (2), installed on the roof of the main structure, and a porch (3).

The main structure has a rectangular shape with dimensions of 5.05 x 3.25 x 2.35 meters. Assembled from ready-made reinforced concrete elements.

The combat casemate looks like a reinforced concrete ring with a diameter of 2 meters and a height of 2 meters. It is installed on the roof of the main structure and communicates with it through a hatch in the roof of the main structure. This is where the Gorchak is inserted into the combat casemate.

The mattress, which is a reinforced concrete slab measuring approximately 7 x 5 x 1.5 meters, is buried horizontally in the ground above the main structure midway between the roof of the structure and the ground surface and is not shown here. It is intended to protect the structure from damage by large-caliber high-explosive shells and aerial bombs.

The depth of the entire structure is 4.35 meters.

The postern is assembled from reinforced concrete rings of rectangular cross-section and is designed to connect the bunker with the trench (communication course).

The length of the turn can vary depending on where the exit from the bunker needs to be taken, but the standard length is 4.4 meters.

The main building is divided into several rooms. If we go down the turn, then through a sealed armored door we find ourselves in the vestibule (1), in the left and front walls of which there are two more armored doors.

The left armored door leads to a room called the “ventilation and power casemate” (2). This is a very small square room. On the wall of the casemate there is an electrical panel, the cables from which spread to all other rooms.

In addition, the FVKP-M-1 filter-ventilation unit is located in this casemate. It provides air to all the premises of the bunker. If an electric drive is used, then the installation capacity is 100 cubic meters. meters of purified air per hour, if you use a manual drive, then half as much. Air is sucked from the surface of the earth through a supply pipe, passes through carbon filters, where it is cleaned of radioactive dust, gases, toxic substances, and distributed through pipelines to all rooms. In this case, a so-called backwater is created inside the room, i.e.

the pressure inside the structure is slightly higher than outside. Thus, air cannot penetrate into the structure except through the FVU.

An interesting device is VZU-100, which is placed on the outer end of the ventilation pipe. It provides free passage of air into the pipe, but instantly closes as soon as there is a jump in air pressure outside (a shock wave of an ordinary explosion, a nuclear explosion, or an explosion of a thermobaric weapon). For a few seconds, VZU-100 completely blocks the access of air to the bunker. If the bunker's electrical system is powered from a centralized electrical network, then an electric heater operates on the output pipe of the system's air pump, which heats the air in cold weather and ensures the temperature inside the bunker is about 12-15 degrees above zero.
Through the armored door located opposite the entrance you can get into the auxiliary casemate (3). It contains two cabinets for ammunition, a table for preparing cartridge belts and cooling removable machine gun barrels. This room is intended for storing a supply of ammunition, preparing it for use (opening boxes and zinc, stuffing cartridge belts, etc.), minor repairs and maintenance of weapons.

Between the cabinets there is a staircase leading to a hatch into the combat casemate (5).

From the auxiliary casemate through the armored door located on the right wall you can get into the bunker barracks (4). This room is intended to house a bunker garrison. It is also the control point and communications center of the bunker.

If the remaining rooms of the bunker are ventilated only with the help of the FVKP-M-1 filter-ventilation unit, then the barracks, in addition, has natural ventilation due to an additional air supply pipe. Air from the surface enters the barracks through this pipe and exits through the chimney of the heating stove. Thus, the barracks is a warm room even if the external power supply is turned off.

This type of bunker is not equipped with running water and a toilet. Installation of your own gas-electric unit for autonomous power supply is not provided.

An observation periscope can also be projected upward from the barracks, but a periscope is not provided for in the pillbox property list.

Communication with the command post of the fortified area is carried out by telephone. Also, the bunker can, if necessary, be equipped with a radio station.

Internal communication between the premises of the bunker is not provided, but if necessary, the bunker can be equipped with a TPU tank intercom.

Habitability of a bunker in a combat situation is up to 11 people (3-4 people sit on the lower tier of the bunks, and 2 people sleep on the upper two tiers. One sits on a stool at the table, 2 people are on duty in the combat casemate, 1 person is on duty in the ventilation-power casemate and 1 person guards the entrance to the bunker (in the trench). In peacetime, the bunker garrison consists of 4 people (the chief of guard is a sergeant and 3 guard soldiers). One is on duty in the trench at the entrance to the bunker, one is on the waking shift (stokes the stove, is on duty at the telephone, cleans the premises), one is resting.
From the author.

Of course, bunker equipment can be improved indefinitely. You can equip it with running water, a toilet and a shower. Electronic security systems and surveillance cameras can be installed. Weapon control can be made remote so that the garrison does not rise to the combat casemate at all. But how much will such a bunker cost? And dozens of them have to be built in each fortified area.

In winter, the bunkers give out traces of soldiers who, at certain intervals, come to relieve the garrison, darkened and settled snow near the chimney. And the smoke itself, even if you heat the stove only at night, on windless frosty days does not dissipate above the chimney until the middle of the day. During thaws, the snow above the bunker settles and melts, no matter how perfect the thermal insulation is. In photographs taken at dawn or before sunset from an airplane or even from a good tower, this can be seen quite clearly.
Leave the bunker unguarded for the winter? And who will maintain the weapons and monitor their safety?

In summer, the worst enemy for such a pillbox is grass. In the Far East in the Primorsky Territory, where there is a lot of sun and rain, grass grows vigorously and very quickly, reaching a height of one and a half to two meters. Mow it down at least in the firing sectors? These bunkers are given out headlong. Don't touch the grass at all? But then the bunker cannot fulfill its task. Nothing will be visible from it.

There is, of course, a way of camouflage through the economic activities of the local population.
They can cut the grass for their livestock, thereby freeing the area from grass. In winter, carry out snow retention or transport hay from stacks, thereby hiding the soldiers' traces.

In general, the problem of camouflaging fortifications in fortified areas is of paramount importance and, as a rule, not a single country that had fortified areas in peacetime has been able to solve it. Long before the start of the war, the enemy knew exactly the number and location of all defensive structures and made his plans accordingly. The French Maginot Line fell without delaying the Germans for a single day; the German Atlantic Wall held out for a matter of hours.

Only the Mannerheim line in 1939 detained the Red Army for a long time near its embrasures, and even then not so much because of its defensive power, but because of the capricious attitude towards this war of all the Red soldiers from Marshal Voroshilov (whom this war cost the post of People's Commissar of Defense) to the last Red Army soldier. And when, after Stalin’s menacing roar, they got down to business seriously, the Finnish defense also collapsed in a matter of days.

A different matter is field bunkers, which were built already during the war and are primitive reinforced concrete boxes with embrasures in the walls. The enemy does not know where they are; during artillery barrage they cannot be destroyed, and the advancing infantry is completely crushed under the pressure of sudden machine-gun fire from the bunkers. While heavy guns are brought up and the bunkers are destroyed, precious time is wasted, during which the enemy manages to bring up reserves to the attacked area and disrupt the offensive.

That’s why all commanders are so afraid of and don’t like enemy pillboxes and so take care of their own. Sources and literature: 1.Guide to military fortifications.
Approved by the Chief of Engineering Troops on December 15, 1962.
Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Moscow 1962
2. Kalibernov E.S. Engineer Troops Officer's Handbook. Moscow. Military publishing house. 1989
3. Kalibernov E.S., Kornev V.I., Soskov A.A.
Combat engineering support. Moscow. Military publishing house. 1984
4.Textbook. Military engineering training. Moscow. Military publishing house. 1982
5. Manual on supporting combat operations of the Ground Forces. Part IV. Engineering support. Actions of units and units of engineering troops. Moscow. Military publishing house.

1985
6. Manual on military engineering for the Soviet Army. Moscow. Military publishing house.

I became interested in the types and designs of field fortifications (FS),
used by the Nazis to defend their borders from Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (WWII).

The article greatly provoked me, I began to look for additional information, found it, and, based on my modest capabilities, tried to create a brief overview of the evolution of the forms of field fortification equipment (FO) of the German troops.
By and large, this is a republication of material that is rare, in my opinion... And my debut on Military Review.

The Germans' methods of fouling terrain changed over the years during the Second World War in accordance with the general course of military operations. Four main periods can be distinguished:

First period
Refers to the beginning of the war, when the Germans, inspired by the temporary success obtained as a result of taking advantage of the advantages of surprise, based on their theory of “Blitzkick War”, did not attach importance to the issues of strengthening the area.
Defensive measures were reduced mainly to the creation of outposts around populated areas, railway stations and at communication centers. Basically, these events were intended to protect communications from possible attacks by our troops and to fight partisans.

Second period
The beginning of the second period, in the development of field fortification forms of the Germans, can be considered the defeat of their troops near Moscow (winter 1941-1942).
Having experienced the powerful offensive attacks of the Soviet troops, the Germans began to pay more attention to the issues of strengthening the area.
They moved from individual systems of outposts to a developed system of strongholds and defense centers.
The defensive lines were a chain of reinforced defense units and strongholds straddling command heights, most of them grouped around populated areas and located at a distance of 2 to 4 km from each other.
The gaps were filled with machine-gun and rifle trenches and separate firing structures.
The defense nodes and strongholds of the German defense consisted of 1-2 lines of trenches and communication passages, with cells and platforms prepared in large numbers for all types of fire weapons, observation posts, as well as shelters, refuges and dugouts for soldiers and officers.
All strongholds were connected to each other by a well-branched network of roads - radial and linear, providing the possibility of wide maneuver and the transfer of reserves from the depths of the defense.
Such a system of building a defense, with clearly defined strongholds and weakly defended gaps, could not withstand the powerful attacks of the Soviet Army with its tactics of deep encirclements and envelopments.

Third period
Characterized by the widespread transition of the Germans to defense (1943).

The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk knocked out their last hope for the success of offensive operations. The Germans built their defense on a well-thought-out, clearly organized system of fire of all types, infantry combat formations located in concentration in tactically important commander areas of the terrain and on active reserve operations.

Engineering and fortification support for defense was mainly reduced to ensuring the tactical survivability of fire weapons, the reliability of the fire system, mainly in front of the front edge and on the flanks, shelters for manpower and materiel, and the speed of maneuver of reserves and weapons.
The front edge of the line, as a rule, was provided by a continuous trench, most richly equipped with firing structures, in the form of the simplest open firing platforms.

Behind the first, in tactically more important directions, there were a second, third, and sometimes even a fourth line of trenches.
A condensed system of trenches, equipped with various kinds of fortifications, was mainly strongholds.
As a rule, there were no unfortified gaps between strongholds.

The concept of a strong point, when the Germans fortified an area with a system of trenches, was to a certain extent conditional and not firmly fixed on the ground, since the possibility of easily developing a system of trenches on any part of the line and quickly occupying it with one or another element of the battle formation led to changes in the outline of the stronghold point and even shift it along the front and in depth.
A new stronghold in a trench system for strengthening terrain could quickly be created where it was needed due to changes in the combat situation.
Obstacles of various kinds were used by the Germans mainly in front of the front line of defense, that is, they were installed in front of the first trench.

The fourth period
Characterized by the retreat of German troops on all fronts, taking flight under the increasing blows of the Soviet Army.
With regard to the fortification equipment of the area, this period is characterized by the fact that the Germans tried to hide behind large natural barriers, behind ramparts prepared in advance and delay the offensive; they quickly fortified the high banks of large rivers and strengthened existing long-term boundaries.
For the most part, the Germans no longer had time to create new frontiers.

The fortification equipment of the area appears in all its diversity during the 3rd period.
It was then (in 1943) that the Germans most widely used armored machine gun hoods: “Crabs”.
Moreover, they were used not only on the Eastern Front.
At least one Crab was captured by Allied forces during the liberation of Mount Lungo, Italy, in 1944.

Machine gun armor cap "MG - Panzernest" (Crab).
By definition of the Allies - “Mobile metal pillbox”.
Weight and dimensions characteristics of MG - Panzernest:

Total height: 182 cm
Max. width: 152
Weight: 3 tons

Delivery of MG – Panzernest to the front line

A short excerpt describing the Izyum-Barvenkov offensive operation:
“In July 1943, our regiment supported the 8th Guards Army during the crossing of the Seversky Donets River in the area of ​​Izium. I, as the chief of reconnaissance of the regiment, followed in the first echelon of attacking rifle units, under enemy fire I crossed the river along the assault bridge.
But the enemy opened heavy fire from machine guns hidden on the high right bank of the river, and our infantry lay down. In addition, the enemy’s first defense position was heavily mined, and his aircraft continuously bombed our battle formations.
Our artillery fired at the machine-gun points, but they continued to fire. I noticed one well-hidden machine gun.
He caused one of his batteries to fire. The explosions were accurate, the machine gun fell silent, but soon opened up furious fire again.
I repeated the fire again. Together with the infantry, I moved forward in dashes. We went to these machine gun points. These turned out to be armored caps buried in the ground. Actually, the armored cap rose 40-50 cm above the ground, it had a small embrasure closed by an armored flap. A large-caliber machine gun was installed in the hood and there was a machine gunner. Such armored caps were called “crabs” - they were a new weapon.
The machine gun I was firing at was covered in dirt, so he stopped firing.
Unfortunately, there was no direct hit on the armored cap.
There were many such machine gun points in this direction, some even lay on the ground - the enemy did not have time to bury them. Therefore, with great difficulty, our infantry captured a bridgehead on the right high bank of the Seversky Donets River.”
(Chernyshev E.V.)

"Crab" captured near Orel, front view

"Crab" captured near Orel, rear view
Photo by A.P. Troshkina, 07/03/1943

The photo shows that they did not have time to bury him, but simply lowered him into a funnel dug for him.

MG - Panzernest. Inside view.

Three-dimensional diagram of MG - Panzernest and stages of its installation

In the newspaper "Red Star" dated September 3, 1943 and in the "Military Engineering Journal" No. 10 for 1943, a description of the German armored cap (crab) is given.
The tests carried out on the original fan and furnace installed in the armored hood yielded a number of interesting data, with which it is useful to familiarize the officers of the engineering troops, since the enemy installs armored hoods on all fronts and, captured by our troops, they can be successfully used.
The armored machine gun hood is equipped with mechanically driven exhaust ventilation.

Diagram of heating and ventilation equipment MG – Panzernest

Air intake
is carried out above the head of the second number through a hole (1) covered with a metal mesh (see figure).
The air passes through the air duct (2) to the fan and through the air duct (3) is exhausted through the exhaust port (4) to the outside.
Partial release of air through the heating chimney is possible.
For this purpose, there is a pipe (5) connecting the air duct (3) to the furnace ash. There is a valve (6) on the nozzle, which regulates the amount of air passed through the stove and disconnects the stove from the ventilation duct.
In addition to air exhaust through the hole (1), air is sucked out of the box with spent cartridges through a flexible metal hose (7) connecting the box to the ventilation duct (2). The amount of air sucked through the sleeve vent is approximately 25% of the total amount of air supplied.

Air extraction
is carried out by a centrifugal fan (suction hole diameter - 70 mm) with a foot pedal drive.
To ensure shift work of the first and second numbers of the machine gun crew, there are two pedals on the fan.
All ventilation ducts are made of black iron with welded seams; their connection is made using rubber couplings with metal flat clamps and flanges.

Tests carried out at the Scientific Testing Engineering Institute showed that the performance of the ventilation system ranges from 200 to 280 m3/hour at 40 to 70 pedal strokes per minute.
The average nominal number of fan pedal strokes should be considered 50 - 60 per minute. The number of swings 80 - 90 per minute should be considered maximum; At this intensity, continuous operation is possible for no more than 5 minutes.
With continuous operation of the ventilation system, intensive firing from the MG-34 machine gun brings the concentration of carbon monoxide in the casemate to a maximum of 1 mg/l (with the hatch closed and the periscope openings open).

With inactive ventilation, any intense shooting from a machine gun is impossible.
Powder gases released during firing and gases from burning barrel lubricant quickly fill a small volume of the structure and make the air completely unsuitable for breathing.

This circumstance, by the way, makes it possible, along with the main anti-armor means in case of close blocking, it is recommended to block the exhaust ventilation and stove (if any) openings with turf, clay, earth or snow, which does not present any difficulties.
Such an event will not be able to damage the hood, but the intensity of the fire will be reduced to a minimum.
The personal chemical protective equipment available to the crew, if ventilation is inactive, will not provide significant assistance, since they do not retain carbon monoxide.

Heating The armored machine gun hood is made by a welded iron furnace, which consists of a firebox, a convection part and a blower.

The stove is made of sheet iron 1.2 mm thick with double walls at the firebox; the chimney is made of black roofing iron.
The stove is installed on legs on special wooden spacers and bolted to the bottom of the structure.

Gases from the firebox enter the convection part, where they pass through three shaped tubes and go into the chimney.
From the outside, shaped convection tubes are freely washed by air passing through the holes and grille.
The chimney is discharged through a hole for the axle, which is inserted into the armored cap during its transportation.
The pipe consists of two elements: section 5, located inside the structure, and section 6, located outside.

The furnace firebox is separated from the blower by a grate made of sheet iron 2–3 mm thick with holes 8–10 mm; the grate is welded to the walls of the furnace. An asbestos cord is built into the ash door and firebox around the perimeter adjacent to the hole, which ensures that the stove is tightly closed.

If ventilation is inactive, the furnace can operate without blowing with the blower door open, however, in this case, due to the small diameter and height of the chimney, the possibility of smoke in the structure cannot be ruled out.

When working with blast, with the valve (6) open, both oven doors must be carefully closed.
In this case, the relative tightness of the stove and chimney ensures that the structure cannot become smoke-filled.
The presence of blast under the grate, the design of the grate itself and the height of the bottom of the loading hole above it (17 cm) provide the ability to burn a wide variety of fuels (wood, coal, peat) in the stove.

However, the instruction manual to avoid unmasking, it is recommended to heat the stove only with charcoal.
For the same reasons, the instructions recommend turning off the blast under the grate when firing a machine gun.

If there is no need, the furnace may not be installed in the structure at all; in this case, the hole in the air duct (3) for the branch pipe (5) is closed with a screw-on plug, and the hole in the cap through which the chimney is discharged is closed with a massive metal plug.

It was not only the Germans who built and used both portable and permanent fortifications.
Here are some examples.

authors
Ivan Volkov, Evgeniy Khitryak photos and drawings of the authors

“There is a widespread opinion that the pioneers in the field of using tanks in fortification and the most effective creators of structures of this kind were the Germans. A huge number of American and Western European books devoted to tanks and fortification during the Second World War played a significant role in the establishment of this opinion. can be found in similar literature - these are photographs and drawings of various “tobruks” - German reinforced concrete positions in the version when a light tank turret was installed on them, as well as various versions of pillboxes in the turrets of the Panther tank. An abundance of amateur literature praising German weapons has led. to the fact that most readers have a completely wrong idea about this small but interesting section of the history of military equipment and fortification.
The Germans were not the creators of the concept of using tanks in fortification, they were not the first builders of such structures, moreover, they cannot be given the palm in the matter of the most widespread use of such structures. The Germans turned out to be simply the most talented and successful imitators. To confirm this statement, it is enough to cite just one fact. When, in the first half of 1930, German tank forces just began to form, since until that moment the terms of the Versailles Treaty prohibited Germany from having its own tanks, other European countries already had quite a lot of tanks that had become obsolete and were literally living out their last days in combat formation. The search for a solution to the issues of using obsolete, but still quite combat-ready vehicles, as well as the use of serviceable parts of tanks that have exhausted their service life, led to the emergence of the concept of using tanks in long-term fortification. This was nothing more than a turn to the roots, because the tank was essentially a pillbox that had the ability to move.
The concept of using a tank in fortification appeared almost simultaneously in France and the USSR, that is, in countries that at that time had the most numerous tank troops not only in Europe, but also in the world."
Boguslav Perzhik
"Karelian fortified area - unknown fortifications"

magazine "Nowa Technika Wojskowa", May 2002

The T-26 tank turret dismantled from building No. 69 (Vishnevka village area) is on display at the Stalin Line historical and cultural complex.

IN Probably, despite a rather striking debut on the battlefields of the First World War, by the end of the 1920s tanks as a new type of weapon were not yet taken seriously by most military theorists. However, there is nothing surprising in this. Tanks of that time were slow-moving and unreliable vehicles. A whole series of revolutionary innovations had to be introduced into their design in order to turn the self-propelled “tub” into a truly formidable weapon. It seemed like a rather difficult and long task. In the meantime, infantry and cavalry remained the main means of waging an offensive war. 5

“A tank, in conditions of overcoming a long-term line, cannot completely destroy the machine-gun fire system, but is able to partially disrupt it and reduce the effectiveness of the fire,” is written in paragraph 37 of the chapter “Anti-tank defense” of the manual “Combat use of artillery in fortified areas,” dating back to 1932. 1 In full accordance with such views on the role of the tank on the battlefield, the fortified areas that began to be built in the USSR at the turn of 1920-30 were predominantly saturated with machine-gun firing points. Artillery structures - half-caponiers and caponiers for two and four 76-mm guns of the 1902 model - were also designed mainly to combat enemy personnel. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that until the second half of the 30s, the ammunition of casemate guns consisted exclusively of unitary cartridges with fragmentation grenades and buckshot, created before the First World War. It was only when the incredible progress in tank design became obvious that armor-piercing shells were hastily developed for these guns. 2 .

It should not be assumed, however, that the engineers who developed fortified areas did not think at all about anti-tank protection of their facilities. It was planned to implement it mainly through engineering means. It was assumed that scarps and counter-scarps, tank traps and mines, coupled with artillery support for the filling units, would be quite enough to make the fortified area impassable for tanks 3 . No one at that time imagined how quickly clumsy, poorly armed and vulnerable even to armor-piercing bullets, wedges like the French Renault FT-17, the English Vickers Mk.IV or the Italian Fiat 3000 would give way to formidable machines that could sometimes infantry support to carry out deadly raids deep into enemy defenses. This was a sincere delusion, although somewhat later, during the Stalinist “purges,” many designers and theorists paid with their lives for the sabotage underestimation of the tank danger.
Only in isolated cases were fortified areas of the first stage of construction (1929-1936) equipped with special structures to combat enemy armored vehicles. A special casemate anti-tank gun did not exist at that time, either in metal or on paper. The possibility of placing a field anti-tank gun in a long-term firing point was sought, but this practice did not take root. 4 . Therefore, a simpler solution was found. The tank itself, but converted into a stationary firing point, can become an acceptable anti-tank missile.

Structures of this type were supposed to be erected in the SD in the most tank-dangerous directions. The above-mentioned instruction “Combat use of artillery in fortified areas” prescribed the construction of stationary anti-tank firing points in such areas at the rate of 10 structures per 1 km of front 5 . During the construction of the structures, towers and fragments of hulls of T-26 tanks of the 1933 model were used.
Obviously, a systematic study of documents from Russian military archives will sooner or later make it possible to name the names of the specialists who directly developed the standard design of a tank-tower pillbox VET. However, most likely, these will be the names of ordinary designers and draftsmen, and maybe even graduates of the military academy, for whom this project was a kind of “test of the pen.” When developing this structure, the designers did not seek to “reinvent the wheel”, but rather unified the new type of firing point as much as possible under the already tested technology for constructing reinforced concrete DFS. This was required by common sense, short construction deadlines, and the austerity regime.

MiUR. BRO VIII, pillbox PTO No. 69, village area. Vishnevka. The tower was dismantled and transported to the exhibition of the IKK "Stalin Line".

Structurally, the Soviet pillbox with a tank turret consisted of two main elements - a concrete mass, almost entirely buried in the soil, and a standard tank turret placed on the roof of the structure. The extremely low silhouette allowed the object, with proper camouflage, to remain unnoticed for a considerable time, and therefore invulnerable to enemy fire.
Despite the comparative simplicity of the design and the obvious advantages of such a structure, pillboxes with tank turrets were built in the first half of the 1930s in very limited quantities and in a very short period of time from 1932 to 1934. In total, only 19 firing points with turrets were built T-26 tanks and they were built in two border fortified areas - Polotsk (10 units) and Minsk (9 units) 6 .
An interesting feature of pillboxes with a tank turret is their similarity, if not identity. While machine gun and artillery pillboxes are inherently individual in design - each structure has “personal” features of geometry or placement of combat casemates (the result of optimal “fitting” of structures into the surrounding area, which was especially noted in their report by German specialists who studied the captured Soviet fortifications) - tower pillboxes differ from each other, perhaps, only in the shape of the external contours of the concrete mass.

design description

Drawing of a typical Soviet anti-tank pillbox with a T-26 tank turret.
The numbers in the drawing show:
1 - manual air pump
2 - filter battery
3 - radio operator's place; on the right is the bell of the speaking pipe; on the left - table for telephone UNA-I-31
4 - radio station 6PK
5 - place of supplying shells
6 - bracket ladder leading to the tower
7 - breath
8 - anti-assault grille
9 - pit for filters of an additional air purification circuit
10 - water intake well
11 - entrance defense loophole.

G The main characteristics of a fortification are its protection from enemy fire and the effectiveness of its weapons.
The concrete mass of the pillbox belonged to the M2 security class and had a wall thickness of 1 m and a coating thickness of about 1.3 m. Concrete structures of this type could withstand fire from high-explosive shells of 155 mm caliber. But at the same time, the tank turret had only bulletproof armor. As a result, the main combat element of the pillbox was also its “Achilles heel”. The emphasis was placed only on the small size of the tower and skillful camouflage. In addition, the pillbox had to fire at enemy armored vehicles, for whose guns (due to their flatness) such a low-lying object was a rather difficult target.
Turrets for T-26 tanks of the 1933 model were produced at the Izhora and Mariupol plants since the end of 1932. No significant changes or additions were made to the tower design before its installation on site. It is generally accepted that for the needs of fortified areas, turrets of tanks that had exhausted their service life or were written off for some other reason were transferred. However, it is highly doubtful that the tanks produced in 1932 would have become so worn out by 1933-34 7 .

The main weapon of the pillbox was the unitary 45-mm 20K tank gun, developed by Factory No. 8 in early 1932. Along with the gun, a 7.62-mm Degtyarev tank machine gun (DT) was installed in the armored mask. The vertical guidance angles of the twin installation ranged from -8 to +25 degrees. The gun had a semi-automatic mechanical bolt. Firing from the cannon and machine gun was carried out using foot release pedals, which were located on the footrest under the gunner’s right foot. The sighting devices of the installation consisted of a TOP tank telescopic sight of the 1930 model and a PT-1 tank panoramic periscope sight of the 1932 model. Fire from a machine gun could be carried out independently of the gun, through an open sight. In this case, the vertical firing sector of the machine gun was +/-4.5 degrees.
The ammunition stored in the turret was 52 rounds. 40 of them were located in trays at the rear of the turret, and 12 were located in vertical “cups” along the sides. The bulk of the pillbox's ammunition was stored in racks installed along the wall of the fighting compartment located under the turret. The main supply of disks for the machine gun was also located there. The design of the machine gun magazine made it possible to store discs loaded with cartridges; Immediately before firing, it was only necessary to cock the pusher spring to its firing state. 6 equipped machine-gun discs were placed directly in the turret - in a rack on the right wall.
The turret body had two viewing slots, protected by triplex armored glass, and several openings for firing personal weapons, closed from the inside with flat plugs.

A gearbox for the turret rotation mechanism was installed on the left hand of the gun. The turret was rotated manually. The design of the rotation mechanism (or, more precisely, the mechanism for horizontal aiming of the gun) was typical and similar to a similar device on the T-26 tank. The fixed gear ring, which in the tank is made integral with the hull, was attached to the top plate of the concrete mass of the pillbox. When the handle of the flywheel of the turning mechanism rotated, the drive gear was set in motion. It rolled along the gear ring, causing the tower to rotate. A special brake kept the turret from spontaneously rotating when the gun rolled back or during a sharp impact.
A fan was also installed in the roof of the turret of the T-26 tank to push out the powder gases generated during the shot. Later, on BT tanks, they refused to install a fan, but on the T-26, especially in the first years of production, fans were a mandatory part of the turret configuration. However, when installing a tower in a concrete mass, the fans were most often dismantled, closing the hole with a metal plug, since the pillboxes had their own ventilation system.

For spent cartridges in the breech of the gun, a cartridge collection bag, or “case catcher purse,” was provided. Depending on the modification, the “wallet” could hold from 28 to 60 cartridges. When it was filled, the crew put the spent cartridges into the empty turret trays 8 . A separate sleeve collection bag was also provided for the machine gun.
In the floor of the turret room there was a square hatch with a wooden lid leading to the interior of the pillbox. In the concrete mass of the structure directly under the tower there was a combat compartment; next to it, fenced off by a thin concrete partition (10-15 cm thick), there was a technical compartment in which the FVU, internal and external communication equipment and, sometimes, surveillance devices were located. The passage from the fighting compartment to the technical compartment was closed with a standard casemate hermetic door - oak, covered with a metal sheet.
In addition to the hatch in the floor of the turret room, there was also a rectangular hole through which the crew could transfer shells from the fighting compartment to the turret without lifting the hatch cover. Also, holes were provided in the floor for installing speaking pipes and an air duct. Using a ladder built into the wall, the crew could move from the fighting compartment to the turret and back. The walls and ceiling of the structure were sheathed with anti-spalling clothing - a metal sheet, most often corrugated. This coating served to protect the crew from concrete fragments formed when shells hit the pillbox array.
Directed, as a rule, to the rear, the exit from the pillbox was made in the form of a standard draft for Soviet pillboxes or a dead end with an air vent, which protected the entrance doors (similar in design to the doors between the internal premises of the pillbox) from the effects of the shock wave. The entrance to the dead end was closed with an anti-assault grill and fired from the technical compartment through a special loophole covering the entrance.
Many anti-tank gun pillboxes had a lightweight reinforced concrete extension, identical to the one added to the machine gun pillboxes. Its main purpose is to protect the filter bank of the alternative air supply circuit from fragments and shock waves. The filters were installed in a specially equipped recess in the floor of the extension. It can also be assumed that in peacetime the annex could have been used as a kind of guardhouse for a sentry.

During the operation of the bunkers of the early program, the buildings were subject to various modifications and modernizations. This fully applies to pillboxes with tank turrets. Initially, it was planned to place outdoor air purification filters outside the bunker in a concrete ditch. It also provided for the supply of outside air to the bunker, bypassing the filter system. This was necessary to create excess pressure in the structure, thereby pushing out the poisonous gases generated during firing. The air supply was created by a manual fan of the KP-4 type. Later it was decided to place the filters inside the structure. This is caused not only by the danger of damage to filters by shrapnel during combat operations, but also by natural factors. Rovik was often flooded with groundwater and rainwater, which, coupled with high air humidity, caused rapid corrosion of the filter housing.
Internal communication in the bunker was to be ensured by a system of speaking pipes connecting the technical rooms and the crew in the tower. There were two pipes going into the tower: the first connected the gun crew and the commandant of the structure, the second - the crew and the turret casemate. However, it seems highly doubtful that this device could function effectively during the battle - the roar of shots makes it impossible to hear anything. At that time, practically no attention was paid to the development of radio communication devices that could effectively replace a rather primitive intercom device in the USSR. However, attempts were made to create calling light devices SOT, YOZH and DECOR.

Things were no better with external means of communication. The standard design provided for the installation of a 6PK type radio station in each pillbox - four metal corners were laid under it at the stage of pouring the concrete mass into the rear wall of the pillbox, and a casing pipe was installed into the coating for the antenna output. However, the delivery deadlines for the radio stations were missed. In addition, a lot of shortcomings were discovered in the design of the radio station, the blame for which was immediately placed on the “pest” manufacturers. The field version of the 6PK radio station, which was used by the troops at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, was called “see-hear” by signalmen, not without reason, because of its very limited range. In a casemate installation, such a device was ineffective.

A wired telephone was recognized as a more reliable means of communication in a fortified area. All structures of the program built in 1929-38, including anti-tank pillboxes, were equipped with the UNA-I-31 telephone set and the so-called K-10 or K-12 type number plate - a simple switch with 10 or 12 numbers. The license plate was attached to the wall of the building next to the signalman’s place, the telephone was installed on a folding table. The UNA-I inductor telephone was the best telephone device produced in the USSR at that time, quite simple, reliable and stable in operation. The main unit of the device was an inductor - a dynamo, which served to send a signal to the subscriber. The phone was powered by a portable battery consisting of two water-filled cells. The telephone provided reliable communication at a distance of up to 20-25 km when using telephone cable lines. Such two-wire lines in the UR were initially planned to be carried out in the form of underground communications, but for the sake of economy they limited themselves to conducting field lines (with a slight deepening into the soil, and sometimes without deepening at all). Later, in 1938, based on the results of inspections, it was ordered to replace the field lines lines with an underground protected cable, but the work was not completed due to the outbreak of the Second World War and the expansion of the USSR to the west 9 .
Of the eight surviving pillboxes with a tank turret from the Minsk UR, only one had a prepared hole in the roof for installing a casing pipe for an external surveillance periscope. Most likely, it was planned to install a standard casemate periscope of the PDN-2 type, with double magnification, in the bunker. However, neither the periscope nor even the casing was ever installed. This situation was typical for the BVI fortified units - surveillance devices (as noted by the inspection commissions) were installed very carelessly, and in some structures the holes for the periscope provided for in the documentation were absent altogether. However, in a pillbox with a tank turret, the tightness in the technical room made it almost impossible to maintain an all-round view from the structure through the periscope.

To illuminate the structure, a local electrical network was developed, powered by a battery, with illumination of the casemates by below-deck lights. The bunker array provided an input cable to power the bunker from the petrol unit of a neighboring point, if one was located nearby 10 . To illuminate the pillbox, battery-powered lanterns were also used (according to the norms, 2-3 lanterns per structure), bat-type lanterns (4 per pillbox), as well as stearin candles (up to 2 kg per structure).
Like other one-story M-type structures, the pillbox with a tank turret was not designed for permanent residence of a garrison. The pillbox crew was located in a dugout located near the DFS. The design of the dugout was no different from an ordinary field one - bunks were built for the personnel and a stove was installed. A trench led from the dugout into the structure, allowing the crew to easily and quickly get into the pillbox even during shelling. The ammunition depot was also a dugout-type field structure and was located in close proximity to the firing point. The capacity of such a warehouse was, according to standards, from 0.5 to 1 ammunition (1 ammunition for a 45-mm gun - 1000 shells) 11 . Along with the shells, an emergency supply of food, water and medicine was stored in the warehouse.
As stated above, an armored turret structure is much more vulnerable to enemy artillery fire than other reinforced concrete fortifications. Therefore, during the construction of such structures on the ground, special attention was paid to camouflage. Armored turret pillboxes had to be camouflaged in accordance with the manuals and instructions for one of the established forms of camouflage. The most primitive of them was painting the tower and the visible part of the concrete mass in the colors of the surrounding area. At the same time, it was recommended to choose either facade greenish No. 2 or facade greenish No. 3 as the main color for buildings in military districts on the western border of the USSR. The color of the deforming spots was chosen according to location. A more complex form of camouflage was the installation of frame structures on which camouflage nets were attached (usually made of wire with a diameter of 1-1.5 mm, with a cell of 10 by 10 cm), or disguising a pillbox tower as a hill, a slope, a group of bushes or a group of stones . Often, when there was a shortage of special camouflage materials, natural materials (stones, branches), as well as a variety of secondary raw materials were used 12 .

The increase in the quantity and quality of tanks in the second half of the 1930s forced the command of the Red Army to reconsider its attitude to the anti-tank protection of fortified areas. Inspections of the BOVO UR carried out in 1937-38 revealed a glaring lack of even basic anti-tank defense means - engineering field obstacles were not erected at all, and there were practically no anti-tank mines in the UR warehouses. In fact, as inspection documents show, in the Minsk UR with a defense front of 140 km, by the summer of 1937 there were no means other than 9 structures with tank towers to counter tanks. It is unlikely that the situation in other fortified areas was radically different. Based on the results of the MiUR checks, in addition to the hasty construction of engineering barriers, as well as a system of hydraulic structures, a decision was made to urgently build at least 45 more armored turret anti-tank pillboxes. However, these events remained on paper 13 .

Beginning in 1938, the IU RKKA proposed new standard designs for structures, created taking into account the experience of constructing fortification facilities in the USSR. Among other things, the new construction program took into account the weaknesses of existing anti-tank pillboxes. According to the new project, the anti-tank defense pillbox was to be built entirely from reinforced concrete, and casemate installations DOT-2 and DOT-4 were to be used as weapons for such a pillbox. Such objects began to be built in large numbers in all SDs of the second stage of construction (both along the line of the old border and along the border line established after 1939). After September 1939, work to further strengthen the SD of the old USSR border was practically stopped.

MiUR. BRO VIII, pillbox VET No. 75, village area. Karasyovshchina. Tower damage

A separate, extremely interesting topic is the combat use of pillboxes with tank turrets. Unfortunately, we do not have factual information that clearly confirms or refutes the participation of such structures in battles. Data obtained from field research and the results of surveys of local residents are difficult to consider as objective sources. They speak equally for and against the fact that pillboxes were actively used by the Red Army in the summer of 1941. Evidence that this or that structure “knocked at the Germans for several days” raises serious doubts after a thorough examination of some of these knuckle-bang structures - they do not look like a firing point that the enemy was actively suppressing with fire. On the other hand, when it comes to pillboxes with obvious signs of shelling, the memories of local residents are also sometimes discouraging. “The Germans fired later, simply out of hooligan motives.”
It is known that in 1939, after the USSR border was moved many kilometers to the west and the construction of new fortified areas began, the weapons and part of the equipment of the pillboxes of the old defensive line were dismantled and transported to new fortified areas. At the same time, numerous documents (such as, for example, lists of work and measures to maintain the mothballed SD of the old border in working condition) indicate that a significant part of the dismantled units and weapons of the pillboxes were not transferred anywhere, but were stored in SD warehouses and were subject to regular inspection. At the same time, the question of turning the old line of fortifications into an active reserve line of defense was raised more than once. 14 .
When mothballing the tower pillbox, the following items were removed from the structure and put into storage: a gun and a machine gun, observation devices, a horizontal aiming gearbox, a telephone set, a license plate, a fan and filters. At the same time, ammunition was also removed from the bunker. 15 . The UR, which was being mothballed, had a limited garrison, but for the most part it consisted of soldiers with little training or no practice in handling materiel (the trained personnel of the UR of the old border were either redeployed to the 1939 UR borders under construction, or transferred to ordinary rifle units) .

To bring the UR pillboxes of the old border into combat readiness, special personnel, complete equipment and time were required. The commanders of the units who arrived in the UR zone in the first days of the war and hastily took up defense along the line of the old border on the orders of ZAPOVO commander Pavlov had none of this.
It is interesting that on the map (map 118) of a fragment of the Minsk UR given in the German report "Denkschrift uber die Russische Landesbefestungen" there are battle groups "Colonies" and "Zaslavl" (which corresponds to 4, 5, 6, 7 battalion defense areas and a separate company area defense C) some of the anti-tank pillboxes with a T-26 turret are marked with the “Beobachter” icon - observation. It is quite possible that German engineers mistook the unarmed tank turrets for improvised observation armored caps.
There are also references to the fact that the guns from the towers of anti-tank pillboxes were promptly dismantled by partisans in the first months of the war, placed on makeshift carriages and used in operations against German troops. One such weapon is even on display at the Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk. However, there is also no documentary evidence that such improvised “forty-fives” were made specifically from the guns of anti-tank pillboxes. And there were more than enough Soviet BT and T-26 tanks destroyed on the battlefields of the first months of the war.
According to some reports, quite extensive material on combat operations in the MiUR zone, including the combat use of anti-tank pillboxes, was collected by employees of the Stalin Line museum complex in Belarus." We hope that this information is based on facts and not on contradictory ones recollections of eyewitnesses, and, when published, will remove numerous questions related to the participation of tank-tower pillboxes in Soviet fortified areas in hostilities.

3 – In particular, it was believed that it would be quite sufficient to install minefields at a distance of 50 m from the line of pillboxes (at the rate of 250-300 mines per structure). (RGVA, fund 22, inventory 32, file 2590, l. 29)

4 – Attempts were made to install a 37-mm gun of the Hotchkiss system into machine-gun pillboxes in order to thus strengthen the anti-tank defense of the Urals in artillery terms. Tests of this innovation were carried out in the fall of 1936 in bunker No. 337 of the Karelian UR. (RGVA, fund 22, inventory 32, file 2595). Although the test firing results were considered satisfactory, the main disadvantages of the installation were the extremely limited field of fire and the vulnerability of the gun due to the frontal location of the embrasures of most bunkers. (RGVA, fund 22, inventory 32, file 353). This is probably why the installation of Hotchkiss guns into machine gun pillboxes was carried out only in KaUR. According to the “Information on existing SD and new defense construction,” compiled in June 1938, 68 such guns were installed in KaUR. (RGVA, fund 36967, inventory 1, file 80, l. 28).

5 – RGVA, fund 22, inventory 32, file 2586, l. 21.

6 – RGVA, fund 36967, inventory 1, file 80, l. 33

7 – Pillboxes with tank turrets were built in MiUR no later than the summer of 1934. This is evidenced by the report of the Assistant Chief of Engineers of the Red Army Smirnov on the results of a trip to MiUR dated July 8, 1934. In particular, it notes the absence of armor plates on the T-26 firing points, although the towers themselves have already been installed on the structures. (RGVA, fund 22, inventory 32, file 2590, l. 43).

8 – Spent cartridges were required to be handed over to ammunition supply points along with the “wallet.” The careful attitude of calculations towards preserving cartridges for their reuse was stimulated by cash bonuses. (information kindly provided by M. Svirin).

9 – RGVA, fund 36967, inventory 1, file 107, RGVA, fund 36967, inventory 1, files 149, 150.

10 – RGVA, fund 22, inventory 32, file 3424.

11 – RGVA, fund 25874, inventory 4, file 147, l. 58

12 – For example, twisted metal shavings, which, by order of the BOVO commander, were recommended to be obtained from industrial enterprises. (RGVA, fund 25874, inventory 4, file 147, l. 32)

13 “At the same time, in the NKSP warehouses there were a significant number of completely new hulls and turrets of T-26 tanks. The head of the 7th Directorate of the NKSP contacted the Red Army PS several times with requests to take away the indicated buildings for the needs of the SD. In the last message it was already said that if the IU does not see the possibility of using the hulls and turrets, he will give the order to send them to be melted down. (RGVA, fund 22, inventory 32, file 3903).

14 – For example, in the appeal of the head of the Main Military Directorate of the Red Army on the use of SD addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Meretskov, it is proposed: “The existing fortified areas should be prepared as a second fortified zone occupied by field troops for defense on a wide front with the minimum necessary permanent garrison and weapons, number and strength which are established separately for each fortified area.” (materials from the site www.military-economic.ru

Temporary instructions for camouflaging bunkers. GVIU RKKA M. 1939

Chornykh M. Palyavy phone. Dzyarzhaunae issuance of Belarus, sektar Vaisk literature. Mensk 1932

Boguslaw Perzyk. KarelskiRejonUmocniony- fortyfikacjenieznane. – Nowa Technika Wojskowa, May 2002.